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BEYOND THE CITY SQUARE: FISHING IN 
WIDER POOLS WITHOUT SOUNDINGS 
Monica A. Fennell*F 
 A Response to Judith L. Maute, English 
Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons 
for American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 387 
(2007). 
 
 I would like to open up a conversation in 
CITY SQUARE about diversity in the judicial 
appointment process in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, a conversation sparked by Professor 
Judith Maute’s article English Reforms to Judicial 
Selection: Comparative Lessons for American 
States?1  The previous process for appointment to 
the bench in the United Kingdom was one of what 
Professor Maute calls “‘secret soundings’——a 
process of anonymous consultation with unnamed 
sitting judges.”2  Professor Maute explains: 
Once it was done in smoke-filled rooms of 
gentlemen’s clubs or in the Temple 
corridors.  Lawyers were appointed to be 
judges after the right word in the ear; 
they were “tapped on the shoulder” and 
asked if they fancied promotion to the 
 
  * Executive Director, Indiana Pro Bono Commission. 
   F Suggested citation: Monica A. Fennell, Beyond the City 
Square: Fishing in Wider Pools Without Soundings, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 11 (2012), http://urbanlawjournal.com/?p= 
402.  
 1. Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection:  
Comparative Lessons for American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
387 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 389.   
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Bench.  Whom you knew counted; as did your 
college or school.3 
Lady Brenda Hale, the first female Law Lord and 
now the only woman on the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom,4 has affirmed that under the 
previous appointment process there was “no such 
thing as an applications process. . . . No 
application forms, no CVs, nothing . . . 
transparent like that.”5 
 Professor Maute states in her article that 
the British judiciary was almost exclusively 
comprised of “older white males” and had a 
“stunning homogeneity.”6  Cambridge law professor 
Neil Andrews labels this homogeneity as 
extraordinary, saying, “judges were virtually 
cloned.”7  Moreover, Professor Maute notes that 
although the judicial selection process in the 
United Kingdom has not been fraught with 
partisanship as in the United States, the 
“American courts are light years ahead of British 
courts in terms of demographic 
representativeness.”8 Professor Andrews urges 
that, “[a] wider pool of talent exists.  Those 
waters should be fished.”9 
 
 3. Id. at 396.   
 4. See Sally J. Kenney, Britain Appoints First Woman Law 
Lord, 87 JUDICATURE 189, 189-90 (2004); see also Maute, supra 
note 1, at 408. 
 5. Webcast——Justice Ginsburg and Baroness Hale——The British 
and United States Legal Systems, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CENTER (Jan. 
24, 2008), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail. 
cfm?eventID=473; see also Monica A. Fennell, Emergent 
Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 279, 283 (2008).  
 6. Maute, supra note 1, at 389, 406; see also Diversity, 
DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, http://www.dca.gov.uk/judges/ 
diversity.htm (last modified Jan. 17, 2009). 
 7. Neil Andrews, The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court: Three 
Skeptical Reflections Concerning the New Court, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 9, 21 (2011). 
 8. Maute, supra note 1, at 392. 
 9. Andrews, supra note 7, at 24. 
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 Maute outlines a new, more transparent and 
open process for the appointment of judges in the 
United Kingdom.  Created by the Constitutional 
Reform Act of 2005,10 this new judicial appointment 
process was designed, in part, to improve 
diversity and representativeness on the bench.11  
These reforms also moved the United Kingdom’s 
highest court out of Parliament and renamed it the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which may 
give the U.K. Supreme Court a more recognizable 
but still more muted identity than the U.S. 
Supreme Court.12 
 
 10. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 4, § 64 
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2005/4/section/64. 
 11. See Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and 
Dissent?  The Contrasting Roles of the Legislature in U.S. 
and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451, 484 (2011) 
(“With their emphasis on merit rather than on whom a 
candidate knew, the appointment commissions were thought to 
offer potential for achieving greater diversity as well as 
competence, where ‘merit’ was no longer to be understood in 
narrowly constrained, tradition-bound ways.”); Peter L. 
Fitzgerald, Constitutional Crisis over the Proposed Supreme 
Court for the United Kingdom, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 233, 
233 (2004); see also Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court 
for the United Kingdom, DEP’T. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, 4, 32 
(July 2003), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/ 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf. 
 12. See Fennell, supra note 5, at 305 (“[T]he new 
appointment process prioritizes diversity in the judges and 
thereby places more emphasis on the personal identity of 
individual Justices.  Nonetheless, without U.S.-style 
legislative hearings in the appointment process, the U.K. 
Supreme Court Justices will not become as identifiable as the 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices.  The reduction of the judicial 
responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor and the placement of 
the President of the U.K. Supreme Court at the head of the 
judiciary provides an opportunity for the President of the 
U.K. Supreme Court to shape a collective court identity——just 
as Chief Justice Roberts is shaping his Court.  The U.K. 
Supreme Court’s identity as a whole will nonetheless be more 
elusive than U.S. Supreme Court identity because the court 
will sit in panels and not en banc like the U.S. Supreme 
Court. . . . Although the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy 
has diffused the sense of identity for the United Kingdom’s 
highest court, the doctrine of judicial review——which would 
tend to strengthen court identity——is gaining some ground 
with the new constitutional reforms.”).  
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 Professor Maute predicts that this new 
judicial appointment system in the United Kingdom 
will be successful in, among other things, 
increasing diversity on the bench, and she urges 
the United States to look to this model.  It may 
be too early to evaluate for most of the 
judiciary, but so far, the new procedures for 
appointment to the U.K. Supreme Court have not 
resulted in greater diversity.  Lady Hale asserted 
in an interview that she is “quite embarrassed to 
be the only Justice to tick a lot of the diversity 
boxes.”13  The current composition of the U.K. 
Supreme Court is all white, and eleven of twelve 
are male.14  As for the rest of the judiciary, 
Professor Maute already found, even a few years 
ago, a “significant increase in the proportion of 
women and minority lawyers taking silk,” a 
potential stepping stone to the judiciary.15 
 Professor Maute suggests that more can be 
done to gain diversity on the bench and that 
“diversity and merit are not opposed but 
complementary aims.”16  Professor Maute questions 
“numerical nosecounts,”17 yet does not fully 
address how progress should be measured.  The U.K. 
judiciary has already begun to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the new judicial selection 
processes in increasing diversity.  The U.K. 
 
 13. Dan Tench & Laura Coogan, An exclusive interview with 
Lady Hale, UKSC BLOG (Sept. 16, 2010),  http://ukscblog.com/an 
-exclusive-interview-with-lady-hale.  
 14. See Biographies of the Justices, THE SUPREME COURT (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/ 
biographies.html; see also Clark, supra note 11, at 484 
n.167. 
 15. Maute, supra note 1, at 401. 
 16. See id. at 409 (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Tench & Coogan, supra note 13 (“But given that very able 
women do, for a variety of reasons, become less visible than 
men in their legal careers, the judicial appointments system 
should be asking how to select the ones who have really good 
judicial potential, even though they haven’t reached the 
point in their professional careers at which they would in 
the past have been regarded as ready for judicial office.”). 
 17. Maute, supra note 1, at 393. 
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Supreme Court’s equality and diversity strategy 
defines diversity as: 
people who are in one or more of seven 
diversity groups; race, gender identity, 
disability, age, religion or belief or 
sexual orientation.  For staff, we mean 
diversity in its widest sense, encompassing 
people who work part-time or other 
alternative working patterns; people with 
different skills, experiences and 
educational and social backgrounds; and 
people with caring responsibilities.18 
Benchmarks have been established and progress 
measured against the recommendations for 
increasing diversity from the Advisory Panel on 
Judicial Diversity.19  I would like to open up for 
discussion whether the recent Report of the 
Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity provides a 
meaningful way to measure progress in the United 
Kingdom or even in the United States.  How can 
progress be gauged without “nosecounts?” 
 Maute posits that “[h]onest reflection on any 
form of judicial selection must acknowledge that 
political, professional, and social connections 
influence both process and outcome.”20  Professor 
Maute cites a work from 1989 as foundational, but 
it is not clear that this point is settled in the 
courts and outside of academia.  For example, in 
looking at early announcement of the panel of 
judges in U.S. appellate courts, a study states 
that “[t]here is a strong predisposition in the 
American legal system toward the formalist notion 
that judges perform their function without 
 
 18. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom Equality and 
Diversity Strategy 2010-2012, THE SUPREME COURT 2, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/equality_diversity_strate
gy.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
 19. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY: PROGRESS 
TOWARDS DELIVERY OF THE ‘REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 
2010,’ at 3-4 (May 9, 2011), http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
downloads/publications/policy/moj/judicial-diversity-report-
2010.pdf. 
 20. Maute, supra note 1, at 412-13. 
  
16  FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE [Vol. 39:11 
recourse to personal ideology or past experience,” 
but also notes that this notion has come under 
attack and that “judicial characteristics matter 
to legal outcomes.”21  Professor Maute recognizes 
that to 
suggest that individual judges can, or 
should be expected to, best empathize and 
reflect the viewpoints of the demographic 
group from which they come is unwarranted 
and grossly essentialist. . . .  
Nevertheless, it is now generally accepted 
that judges do not decide cases in legal 
vacuums and that their judicial performance 
is influenced by a contextualized 
understanding about society, including 
issues of class, gender, society, and life 
experiences.22 
Professor Maute also concludes that, “[t]o restore 
public confidence in the courts, people must 
believe that judges exercise legitimate authority, 
undistorted by personal or partisan preferences.”23  
How does this statement impact the “personal is 
political” argument made earlier in Professor 
Maute’s article? 
 Professor Maute asserts that the U.S. 
judiciary can learn much from Britain’s judicial 
selection process and from using more modern 
personnel practices.24  This is echoed by Professor 
Terence Lau, who points to the new U.K. judicial 
selection process as “a useful template.”25  This 
 
 21. Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, 
and Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 63, 66 (2007); see also 
Fennell, supra note 5, at 292. 
 22. Maute, supra note 1, at 406.  Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, THE 
NINE:  INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 338 (2007) 
(maintaining, inter alia, that the days of having a Catholic 
seat and a Jewish seat on the U.S. Supreme Court are over). 
 23. Maute, supra note 1, at 423. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Terence J. Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for 
Reform, 9 NEV. L.J. 79, 80 (2008).  Professor Lau suggests 
creating an independent judicial appointment body and notes 
that many states “have adopted some variant of the so-called 
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leads me to my final question for discussion on 
CITY SQUARE.  What are the U.K. judiciary’s modern 
personnel practices that Professor Maute lauds and 
how can they increase diversity on the bench in 
the United States? 
 
 
‘Missouri plan,’ providing for nonpartisan selection of 
judges by independent commissions.” Id. at 126.   
